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FINITELY ADDITIVE BELIEFS AND UNIVERSAL TYPE SPACES1
By Martin Meier
Instituto de Ana´lisis Econo´mico, CSIC
The probabilistic type spaces in the sense of Harsanyi [Manage-
ment Sci. 14 (1967/68) 159–182, 320–334, 486–502] are the preva-
lent models used to describe interactive uncertainty. In this paper
we examine the existence of a universal type space when beliefs are
described by finitely additive probability measures. We find that in
the category of all type spaces that satisfy certain measurability con-
ditions (κ-measurability, for some fixed regular cardinal κ), there is
a universal type space (i.e., a terminal object) to which every type
space can be mapped in a unique beliefs-preserving way. However,
by a probabilistic adaption of the elegant sober-drunk example of
Heifetz and Samet [Games Econom. Behav. 22 (1998) 260–273] we
show that if all subsets of the spaces are required to be measurable,
then there is no universal type space.
1. Introduction. Consider players that are uncertain about a set S, called
the space of states of nature, each element of which can be thought of as
a complete list of the players’ strategy sets and payoff functions, that is, a
complete specification of the “rules” of the game that depend on the state
of nature. (Other interpretations are also possible. For example, if a game
of complete information is given, a state s ∈ S could be the strategy profile
that the players are actually going to choose; see the analysis of epistemic
conditions for Nash equilibrium by Aumann and Brandenburger [1].) In such
a situation, following a Bayesian approach, each player will base his choice
of a strategy on his subjective beliefs (i.e., a probability measure) on S.
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Since a player’s payoff depends also on the choices of the other players, and
these are based on their beliefs as well, each player must also have beliefs
on the other players’ beliefs on S. For the same reason, he must also have
beliefs on other players’ beliefs on his beliefs on S, beliefs on other players’
beliefs on his beliefs on their beliefs on S, and so on. So, in analyzing such
a situation, it seems to be unavoidable to work with infinite hierarchies of
beliefs. Thus, the resulting model is complicated and cumbersome to han-
dle. In fact, this was the issue that prevented for a long time the analysis of
games of incomplete information.
A major breakthrough took place with three articles of Harsanyi [5], where
he succeeded in finding another, more workable model to describe interactive
uncertainty. He invented the notions of type and type space: With each point
in a type space, called a state of the world, are associated a state of nature
and, for each player, a probability measure on the type space itself (i.e.,
that player’s type in this state of the world). Usually it is assumed that
the players “know their own type,” that is, a type of a player in a state
assigns probability 1 to the set of those states where this player is of this
type. This is the formalization of the idea that the players should be self-
conscious. Since each state of the world is associated with a state of nature,
each player’s type in a state of the world induces a probability measure on
S. But also, since with each state of the world there is associated a type
for each player (and hence indirectly a probability measure on S for this
player), the type of a player in a state of the world induces a probability
measure on the other players’ probability measures on S. Proceeding like
this, one obtains in each state of the world a hierarchy of beliefs for each
player, in the sense described above.
The advantages of Harsanyi’s model are obvious: Since we have in each
state of the world just one probability measure for each player, contrary to
the hierarchical description of beliefs, this model fits in the classical Bayesian
framework of describing beliefs by one probability measure, and provides
therefore all its advantages (e.g., it allows for integration with respect to
beliefs).
However, there are also several serious questions that arise with the use of
this model: Although each state of the world in a type space induces a hier-
archy of beliefs for each player, the converse is not obvious: Does each profile
of hierarchies of beliefs arise from a state of the world in some type space,
and if so, is there a type space such that every profile of belief hierarchies
is generated by some state in this type space? What “are” the states of the
world, and what justifies using one particular type space and not another? In
particular, contrary to the case of the hierarchical description of beliefs, it is
not clear what “all possible types” (resp. “all possible states of the world”)
are. More precisely, given a game of incomplete information, working in one
fixed type space to analyze that game could be restrictive in the sense that
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we might miss some possible types (resp. possible states of the world) that
are just present in a bigger type space that contains the one we use. If this
were the case for every type space, then the use of type spaces would be
problematic from a theoretical point of view, because of the restrictive char-
acter of this concept, but it would be problematic also from a more practical
point of view: In their contributions to the debate on epistemic conditions for
backward induction in perfect information games, Stalnaker [16] and Batti-
galli and Siniscalchi [2] have pointed out that the players do “their best” to
rationalize their opponents’ behavior if the backward-induction outcome is
to obtain. This translates into using a type space where a player can find the
needed types he has to attribute to the other players, if he has to explain
(i.e., rationalize) the others’ behavior.
The question concerning “all possible types” can be answered and the
related problems can be solved if there is a type space to which every type
space (on the same space of states of nature and for the same set of players,
of course) can be mapped, preferably always in a unique way, by a map
that preserves the structure of the type space, that is, the manner in which
types and states of nature are associated with states of the world, a so-
called type morphisms. Such a type space would be called a universal type
space. If such a space always exists, one could, in principle, carry out the
analysis of a game of incomplete information in the corresponding universal
type space without any risk of missing a relevant state of the world. On a
technical level, the type spaces—on a fixed set of states of nature and for a
fixed player set—as objects and the type morphisms as morphisms form a
category. If we always require the map from a type space to the universal
type space to be unique, then, if it exists, such a universal type space is a
terminal object of this category. A terminal object of a category is known
to be unique up to isomorphism. Hence, we are justified to talk about the
universal type space.
The existence of a universal type space was proved by Mertens and Zamir
[14] under the assumption that the underlying space of states of nature is
a compact Hausdorff space and all involved functions are continuous. That
topological assumption was relaxed by Brandenburger and Dekel [3], Heifetz
[6] and Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [13] to more general topological assump-
tions. Finally, the general measure-theoretic case was solved by Heifetz and
Samet [10], who showed that there also exists a universal type space in this
case. However, in all these articles it has always been assumed that the play-
ers’ beliefs are σ-additive. This seems to be a rather strong assumption on
the epistemic attitudes of the players.
Savage’s postulates [15] imply subjective probabilities that are finitely
but not countably additive. Given the importance of Savage’s theory within
decision theory (i.e., “one-player game theory”), it is natural to ask—and
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desirable to know—what happens if we describe the beliefs of players ac-
cordingly in an interactive context (games) by finitely additive probability
measures? Does there still exist a universal type space?
Still, we are dealing with (now finitely additive) measures, so we have
to define a field of events. The question arises as to which measurability
condition is the right one. Should the field of events be just a field, a σ-field
or should we assume that all subsets of the space of states of the world are
events, that is, that the field is simply the power set? As this question does
not seem to have a clear-cut answer, we analyze the existence/nonexistence
of a universal type space for finitely additive beliefs for a whole class of
different measurability conditions that include the three above-mentioned
cases.
We introduce κ-fields, where κ is an (usually regular) infinite cardinal
number, as fields that are closed under the intersection of every set of events
(i.e., subset of the field) that has cardinality strictly less than κ. It follows
that ℵ0-fields are fields in the usual sense and ℵ1-fields are σ-fields in the
usual sense. Then, we define ∞-fields as fields that are closed under the
intersection of every set of events (of cardinality whatsoever).
We define κ-type spaces as type spaces where the set of measurable events
in the set of states of the world, as well as the set of measurable events in
the set of states of nature, is a κ-field, and ∞-type spaces as type spaces
where the set of measurable events in the set of states of nature is the full
power set and the set of measurable events in the set of states of the world
is a ∞-field. Also, we define ∗-type spaces as type spaces where the set
of measurable events in the set of states of the world as well as the set
of measurable events in the set of states of nature is the full power set.
Furthermore, we define type morphisms, that is, structure-preserving maps
from one κ-type space (resp. ∞-type space or ∗-type space) to another (not
necessarily different) one.
Given a nonempty set of players I , a nonempty set of states of nature
S and a κ-field ΣS on S, we define, similar to Heifetz and Samet [10], a
kind of modal language, the formulas of which we call κ-expressions. But
if κ is uncountable, contrary to Heifetz and Samet [10], we allow also for
formulas of infinite length (but strictly less than κ). Then, we collect the
κ-descriptions (by means of κ-expressions) of all states of the world in all κ-
type spaces on S for player set I . Then we show that the set of κ-descriptions
can be endowed with the structure of a κ-type space (Proposition 4). In this
way, we construct in Section 4 a universal κ-type space on S for player set
I to which every κ-type space on S for player set I can be mapped by a
unique type morphism (Theorem 1).
As Heifetz [7] has shown, there are consistent hierarchies of finitely addi-
tive (in fact even σ-additive) beliefs up to—but excluding—level ω (i.e., the
first infinite level), that have at least two different finitely additive extensions
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to level ω. Does a similar phenomenon hold also on the higher transfinite
levels of consistent hierarchies? Or, put differently in terms of expressions
rather than hierarchies, is there, on the contrary, a regular cardinal κ̂ such
that for all (regular) cardinals κ > κ̂, the κ̂-description of a state in a κ-type
space determines already the κ-description? If this were the case, it would
be unnecessary to consider κ-type spaces for κ > κ̂ and we could restrict
ourselves to κ-type spaces for κ ≤ κ̂. We show in Theorem 3, by using a
probabilistic adaptation of the “sober-drunk” example of Heifetz and Samet
[9], that—with at least two players and two states of nature—this is not
the case. Hence, it makes sense to consider κ-type spaces for every (regular)
infinite cardinal κ.
Also, this example implies that—again, with at least two players and two
states of nature—there is no universal∞-type space and no universal ∗-type
space (Theorem 4 and Corollary 1), even if we do not require the morphisms
from the type spaces to the universal type space to be unique.
2. Preliminaries. First, we will define κ-measurable spaces, where κ de-
notes here an (usually regular) infinite cardinal number. For an introduction
to ordinal and cardinal numbers, see [4] or any other textbook on set theory.
Then, we will develop parts of the theory of κ-measurable spaces needed in
the sequel, collect some known facts about finitely additive (probability)
measures and define the main objects of our study in this paper, the κ-, ∞-
and ∗-type spaces.
An infinite cardinal number κ is called regular, if it is not the supremum
of a set of less than κ-many ordinal numbers which are all strictly smaller
than κ. For example, ℵ0 and all the ℵα+1 are regular, while ℵω is singular
(i.e., infinite and not regular) (ℵω = sup{ℵn|n < ω}), where ω denotes here
the first infinite ordinal number. For a set M , denote by |M | the cardinality
of M .
Unless otherwise stated, α,β, γ, ζ, η, ξ denote ordinal numbers, δ delta-
measures, θ functions from the set of states of the world to the set of states
of nature, κ cardinal numbers, λ limit ordinal numbers, µ and ν measures, pi
projections, ϕ,χ,ψ expressions and ω, apart from above, sets of expressions.
For a set M , Pow(M) denotes the set of all subsets of M , that is, the power
set.
Let κ be an infinite cardinal number and M a nonempty set. A κ-field on
M is a field Σ on M such that E ⊆Σ and |E|<κ imply
⋂
E :=
⋂
E∈E E ∈Σ.
It follows that E ⊆Σ and |E|<κ imply
⋃
E :=
⋃
E∈E E ∈Σ.
Consequently, a κ-measurable space is a pair (M,Σ), whereM is a nonempty
set and Σ is a κ-field on M .
A set of subsets of a nonempty set is a ℵ0-field iff it is a field and it is a
ℵ1-field iff it is a σ-field. If κ
′ <κ, then every κ-field is also a κ′-field.
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Remark 1. Let κ be a singular cardinal number and (M,Σ) be a κ-
measurable space. Then Σ is already a κ+-field, where κ+ denotes the suc-
cessor cardinal of κ.
Proof. Let E ⊆Σ such that |E|≤ κ. So, E has the form {Eα|α < κ}. Let
κ̂ < κ be the cofinality of κ. Then there is a function f : κ̂→ κ, such that⋃
β<κ̂ f(β) = κ. Note that |f(β)| < κ, for β < κ̂. It follows that
⋂
α<κEα =⋂
β<κ̂(
⋂
α<f(β)Eα) ∈Σ. Since Σ is a field, it follows that it is a κ
+-field. 
Since κ+ is always regular, the above remark shows that it is redundant
to consider κ-fields (κ-measurable spaces, resp.) if κ is a singular cardinal.
Let M be a nonempty set. A ∞-field on M is a field Σ on M such
that E ⊆Σ implies
⋂
E :=
⋂
E∈E E ∈Σ. Again, it follows that E ⊆Σ implies⋃
E :=
⋃
E∈E E ∈Σ.
Accordingly, a∞-measurable space is a pair (M,Σ), whereM is a nonempty
set and Σ is a ∞-field on M .
A ∗-measurable space is a pair (M,Pow(M)), whereM is a nonempty set.
Note that every ∗-measurable space is a ∞-measurable space and every
∞-measurable space is a κ-measurable space for every infinite ordinal κ.
A∞-measurable space (M,Σ) is a ∗-measurable space iff for all m 6=m′ ∈M
there is an E ∈Σ such that m ∈E and m′ /∈E.
Example 1. LetM = {0,1}, Σ = {∅,M}. (M,Σ) is∞-measurable, but
not ∗-measurable.
Definition 1. Let M be a nonempty set and F a field on M . A finitely
additive measure on (M,F) is a function µ :F →R ∪ {+∞}, such that:
(i) 0≤ µ(F ), for all F ∈F ,
(ii) µ(E ∪F ) = µ(E) + µ(F ), for all disjoint E,F ∈ F .
µ is a finitely additive probability measure on (M,F), if in addition
(iii) µ(M) = 1.
Definition 2. Let M be a nonempty set, F a field on M , µ a finitely
additive measure on (M,F), and E ⊆M .
We define the outer measure of E induced by µ as
µ∗(E) := inf{µ(F )|F ∈F such that E ⊆ F},
and the inner measure of E induced by µ as
µ∗(E) := sup{µ(F )|F ∈F such that F ⊆E}.
If not stated otherwise, we keep the following.
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Convention 1. (i) If (M,Σ) is a κ-measurable space, then ∆κ(M,Σ)
denotes the space of finitely additive probability measures on (M,Σ). We
consider this space itself as a κ-measurable space endowed with the κ-field
Σ∆κ generated by all the sets {µ ∈∆
κ(M,Σ)|µ(E) ≥ p}, where E ∈ Σ and
p ∈ [0,1].
(ii) Similarly, we denote by ∆(M,Pow(M)) the set of all finitely additive
probability measures on (M,Pow(M)).
Of course, (i) of this convention depends on the particular κ chosen.
Remark 2. Let (M ′,Σ′) and (M,Σ) be κ-measurable spaces and let
f :M ′→M be measurable. Then:
(a) If µ′ is a finitely additive probability measure on (M ′,Σ′), then µ′(f−1(·))
[i.e., µ′(f−1(E)), for E ∈ Σ] is a finitely additive probability measure on
(M,Σ).
(b) If ∆κf :∆
κ(M ′,Σ′)→∆κ(M,Σ) is defined by ∆κf (µ
′) := µ′(f−1(·)), for
µ′ ∈ ∆κ(M ′,Σ′), then ∆κf is measurable, since we have ∆
κ
f (µ
′)(E) ≥ p iff
µ′(f−1(E))≥ p, for E ∈Σ.
Remark 3. Let (M ′,Σ′) and (M,Σ) be κ-measurable spaces and let
f :M ′→M be measurable and onto. Then:
(a) f−1(Σ) := {f−1(E)|E ∈Σ} is a κ-field on M ′ and a subset of Σ′.
(b) If µ is a finitely additive measure on (M,Σ), then µ induces a finitely
additive measure µ′ on (M ′, f−1(Σ)) defined by µ′(f−1(E)) := µ(E). Fur-
thermore, if µ is a finitely additive probability measure, then µ′ is a finitely
additive probability measure.
Lemma 1. Let γ < α be ordinal numbers. For γ ≤ β < α let (Mβ,Fβ)
be a ℵ0-measurable space (i.e., M
β is a nonempty set and Fβ is a field
on Mβ) and µβ a finitely additive probability measure on (Mβ,Fβ), let Mα
be a nonempty set, and for γ ≤ ξ < ζ ≤ α let fξ,ζ :M
ζ →M ξ be onto and, if
ζ < α, let fξ,ζ be F
ζ −Fξ-measurable, such that:
1. fξ,β ◦ fβ,ζ = fξ,ζ, for all ξ < β < ζ such that γ ≤ ξ < β < ζ ≤ α,
2. µβ(f−1ξ,β(E
ξ)) = µξ(Eξ), for all ξ < β such that γ ≤ ξ < β < α and all Eξ ∈Fξ.
Then:
(a)
⋃
γ≤β<α f
−1
β,α(F
β) is a field on Mα,
(b) (µβ)γ≤β<α induces a well-defined finitely additive probability measure
µ<α on (Mα,
⋃
γ≤β<α f
−1
β,α(F
β)), defined by µ<α(f−1β,α(E
β)) := µβ(Eβ), for
Eβ ∈Fβ .
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Proof. That µ<α is well-defined follows from the above conditions 1
and 2 and the fact that the fβ,α’s are onto. In light of the preceding remark,
the rest is clear. 
Notation 1. Let M be a nonempty set, F a field on M , and E ⊆M .
Then denote by [F ,E] the set of all subsets of M of the form (L∩E)∪ (N ∩
(M \E)), where L,N ∈ F . It is easy to check that [F ,E] is the smallest field
that extends F and contains E as an element.
For further reference, we cite the following two lemmas (in a somewhat
different form), which are theorems by  Los´ and Marczewski [12] and Horn
and Tarski [11].
Lemma 2. Let M be a nonempty set, F a field on M , E ⊆M , µ a
finitely additive probability measure on (M,F), µ∗(E) the inner measure of
E, µ∗(E) the outer measure of E, and p a real number such that µ∗(E)≤
p≤ µ∗(E).
Then there exists a finitely additive probability measure ν that extends µ
to the field [F ,E] such that ν(E) = p.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 2 of [12]. 
Sometimes, we will refer to the above lemma as the “ Los´–Marczewski
theorem.”
Lemma 3. Let F1 ⊆F2 be fields on the nonempty set M and let µ be a
finitely additive probability measure on (M,F1). Then there exists an exten-
sion of µ to a finitely additive probability measure ν on (M,F2).
Proof. Follows from point (i) of Section 4 of [12] and also from [11],
page 477, Theorem 1.21. 
3. Type spaces. For this section, unless otherwise stated, we fix a regular
cardinal κ. Furthermore we fix a nonempty set of players I , a nonempty set
of states of nature S, and, unless otherwise stated, a κ-field ΣS on S, such
that for all s, s′ ∈ S with s 6= s′ there is an E ∈ ΣS such that s ∈ E and
s′ /∈E.
We define now κ-type spaces, ∞-type spaces and ∗-type spaces, that is,
the objects which we will study in this paper.
Definition 3. A κ-type space on S for player set I is a 4-tuple
M := 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉,
where:
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(a) M is a nonempty set,
(b) Σ is a κ-field on M ,
(c) for i ∈ I :Ti is a Σ−Σ∆κ-measurable function from M to ∆
κ(M,Σ),
the space of finitely additive probability measures on (M,Σ), such that for
all m ∈M and A ∈ Σ: [Ti(m)] ⊆A implies Ti(m)(A) = 1, where [Ti(m)] :=
{m′ ∈M |Ti(m
′) = Ti(m)},
(d) θ is a Σ−ΣS -measurable function from M to S.
This structure is interpreted as follows:M is the set of states of the world.
Such a state determines completely the objective parameters of the players’
interaction, that is, the state of the nature θ(m), as well as the players’
beliefs about the true state of the world. In general, in a state of the world
m ∈M , player i will not know the true state of the world m; he will just
have a probability measure Ti(m) over the set of states of the world. Ti(m)
describes his beliefs in state m, that is, the type of player i in state m.
[Knowing m would mean that Ti(m) = δm, where δ denotes the Kronecker
delta.] θ(m) is the state of nature that corresponds, to the state of the world
m. While there might be many states of the world to which a given state
of nature s ∈ S corresponds, we have that to every state of the world there
corresponds one and only one state of nature. This is expressed by the fact
that θ is a function θ :M → S.
We will refer to the property that for all i ∈ I ,m ∈M and A ∈Σ: [Ti(m)]⊆
A implies Ti(m)(A) = 1, as the introspection property of κ-type spaces
(∞-type spaces and ∗-type spaces, resp., see below). This expresses the
self-consciousness of the players: In a state of the world m a player does not
attribute a positive probability to states where he has a different belief from
the belief he has in the present state m.
Doing obvious changes, the proofs (of the theorems in this paper) would
go through, if we were to abandon this property; in fact, things would be
easier then.
Definition 4. A ∞-type space on S for player set I is a 4-tuple
M := 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉,
where:
(a) M is a nonempty set,
(b) Σ is a ∞-field on M ,
(c) for i ∈ I :Ti is a measurable function from (M,Σ) to ∆
∞(M,Σ), the
space of finitely additive probability measures on (M,Σ), endowed with the
∞-field generated by all the sets {µ ∈ ∆∞(M,Σ)|µ(E) ≥ p}, where E ∈
Σ and p ∈ [0,1], such that for all m ∈M and A ∈ Σ: [Ti(m)] ⊆ A implies
Ti(m)(A) = 1, where [Ti(m)] := {m
′ ∈M |Ti(m
′) = Ti(m)},
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(d) θ is a Σ−Pow(S)-measurable function from M to S.
Note that for µ 6= ν ∈∆∞(M,Σ) there is an E ∈ Σ and a p ∈ [0,1] such
that µ(E)≥ p and ν(E)< p. This implies that the ∞-field of ∆∞(M,Σ) is
in fact Pow(∆∞(M,Σ)), the full power set. Hence, by the measurability of
Ti, we have [Ti(m)] ∈Σ. So, in fact, the condition that [Ti(m)]⊆A implies
Ti(m)(A) = 1 reduces to Ti(m)([Ti(m)]) = 1.
By the definitions, it is obvious that every ∞-type space on S is a κ-type
space on S, for every regular κ. [Set ΣS := Pow(S) in the κ-type space.]
Definition 5. A ∗-type space on S for player set I is a 3-tuple
M := 〈M, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉,
where:
(a) M is a nonempty set,
(b) for i ∈ I :Ti is a function from M to ∆(M,Pow(M)), the space of
finitely additive probability measures on (M,Pow(M)), such that for all
m ∈M :Ti(m)([Ti(m)]) = 1, where [Ti(m)] := {m
′ ∈M |Ti(m
′) = Ti(m)},
(c) θ is a function from M to S.
Equivalently, a ∗-type space M can be written as M = 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉,
where Σ = Pow(M). So, every ∗-type space on S is a ∞-type space on S.
And therefore, it is also a κ-type space on S.
We define now the beliefs-preserving maps between type spaces.
Definition 6. Let M ′ = 〈M ′,Σ′, (T ′i )i∈I , θ
′〉 and M = 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉
be κ-type spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces, resp.) on S for player set I .
A function f :M ′ →M is a type morphism if it satisfies the following
conditions:
1. f is Σ′ −Σ-measurable,
2. for all m′ ∈M ′:
θ′(m′) = θ(f(m′)),
3. for all m′ ∈M ′, E ∈Σ and i ∈ I :
Ti(f(m
′))(E) = T ′i (m
′)(f−1(E)).
Note that the above definition of a type morphism does not depend on
κ; that is, if κ < κ′, and M and M ′ are κ′-type spaces (∞-type spaces,
∗-type spaces, resp.), then f :M ′ →M is a type morphism from M ′ to M
viewed as κ′-type spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces, resp.) iff it is a type
morphism fromM ′ toM viewed as κ-type spaces. Similarly, ifM ′ andM are
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∗-type spaces, then f :M ′ →M is a type morphism from M ′ to M viewed
as ∗-type spaces iff it is a type morphism from M ′ to M viewed as ∞-type
spaces. (Note that in the case of ∗-type spaces, every function f :M ′ →M
is measurable.)
Definition 7. A type morphism is a type isomorphism, if it is one-to-
one, onto, and the inverse function is also a type morphism.
It is easy to see that a function f :M ′ →M is a type isomorphism iff it
is a type morphism and isomorphism of the measurable spaces (M ′,Σ′) and
(M,Σ).
An easy check shows:
Remark 4. κ-type spaces on S for player set I (∞-type spaces, ∗-type
spaces, resp.), as objects, and type morphisms, as morphisms, form a cate-
gory.
Definition 8. (i) A κ-type space Ω on S for player set I (∞-type space,
∗-type space, resp.) is weak-universal if for every κ-type space M on S for
player set I (∞-type space, ∗-type space, resp.) there is a type morphism
from M to Ω.
(ii) A κ-type space Ω on S for player set I (∞-type space, ∗-type space,
resp.) is universal if for every κ-type space M on S for player set I (∞-type
space, ∗-type space, resp.) there is a unique type morphism from M to Ω.
To keep the terms of the already existing type space literature, we use
the term “universal type space,” although in the language of category theory
the term “terminal type space” would be more adequate, since the universal
type space is a terminal object in the category of type spaces.
Proposition 1. If they exist, universal κ-type spaces on S for player set
I (∞-type spaces, ∗-type spaces, resp.) are unique up to type isomorphism.
Proof. If Ω and U are universal κ-type spaces (∞-type spaces, ∗-type
spaces, resp.) (on the same space of states of nature and for the same player
set, of course), then there are type morphisms f :U → Ω and g :Ω→ U . It
is easy to check that the composite of two type morphisms is also a type
morphism and that the identity is always a type morphism from a κ-type
space Ω (∞-type space, ∗-type space, resp.) to itself. By the uniqueness, it
follows that g ◦ f = idU and therefore f is one-to-one and g is onto, and
f ◦ g = idΩ and therefore g is one-to-one and f is onto. f and g are type
morphisms and f = g−1 and g = f−1. 
To prove the existence of a universal κ-type space on S for player set I
is the goal of the next section.
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4. The universal κ-type space in terms of expressions. Again, for this
section, unless otherwise stated, we fix a regular cardinal κ, a nonempty
player set I and a κ-measurable space of states of nature (S,ΣS) such that
for all s, s′ ∈ S with s 6= s′ there is an E ∈ΣS such that s ∈E and s
′ /∈E.
Given these data, we define κ-expressions (allowing also for infinite con-
junctions) which are natural generalizations of the expressions defined by
Heifetz and Samet [10]. These are formulas that describe events defined
solely in terms of nature and the players’ beliefs. Expressions are defined
in a similar fashion as, for example, the formulas of the probability logic of
Heifetz and Mongin [8]. Analogous to Heifetz and Samet [10], given a κ-type
space on S for player set I and a state of the world in this type space, we
define the κ-description of this state as the set of those κ-expressions that
are true in this state of the world. Then, we show that the set of all κ-
descriptions constitutes a κ-type space (Proposition 4) and that this κ-type
space is the universal κ-type space (Theorem 1).
Definition 9. For a κ-type space 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 on S for player set
I , i ∈ I , E ∈Σ and p ∈ [0,1] define
Bpi (E) := {m ∈M |Ti(m)(E)≥ p}.
Note that Bpi (E) = T
−1
i ({µ ∈∆
κ(M,Σ)|µ(E) ≥ p}) and that Bpi (E) ∈Σ,
if E ∈Σ.
Definition 10. Given a κ-measurable space of states of nature (S,ΣS)
and a nonempty player set I , the set Φκ of κ-expressions is the least set
such that:
1. every E ∈ΣS is a κ-expression,
2. if ϕ is a κ-expression, then ¬ϕ is a κ-expression,
3. if ϕ is a κ-expression, then Bpi (ϕ) is a κ-expression, for i ∈ I and p ∈ [0,1],
4. if Ψ is a nonempty set of κ-expressions with |Ψ| < κ, then
∧
ϕ∈Ψϕ is a
κ-expression.
If Ψ is a nonempty set of κ-expressions with |Ψ|< κ, then we set
∨
ϕ∈Ψϕ :=
¬
∧
ϕ∈Ψ¬ϕ.
Since we work here with a fixed regular κ, we omit sometimes the super-
script κ.
Definition 11. Let M := 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 be a κ-type space on S for
player set I . Define:
1. EM := θ−1(E), for E ∈ΣS ,
2. (¬ϕ)M :=M \ϕM , for ϕ ∈Φκ,
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3. (Bpi (ϕ))
M :=Bpi (ϕ
M ), for ϕ ∈Φκ, i ∈ I and p ∈ [0,1],
4. (
∧
ϕ∈Ψϕ)
M :=
⋂
ϕ∈Ψϕ
M , for Ψ such that ∅ 6=Ψ⊆Φκ and |Ψ|<κ.
So, defined as above, κ-expressions define measurable subsets of M . It is
easy to check that (
∨
ϕ∈Ψϕ)
M :=
⋃
ϕ∈Ψϕ
M , for Ψ such that ∅ 6= Ψ ⊆ Φκ
and |Ψ|< κ.
If no confusion may arise, we omit—with some abuse of notation—the
superscript M .
Definition 12. For a κ-type space M := 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 on S for
player set I and m ∈M define Dκ(m), the κ-description of m, as
Dκ(m) := {ϕ ∈Φκ|m ∈ ϕM}.
Again, we omit sometimes the superscript κ.
The next proposition says that type morphisms preserve κ-descriptions.
Proposition 2. Let 〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉 and 〈N,Σ
N , (TNi )i∈I , θ
N〉 be κ-
type spaces on S for player set I and let f :M → N be a type morphism.
Then, for all m ∈M :
D(f(m)) =D(m).
Proof. We show by induction on the formation of the expressions that
m ∈ ϕM iff f(m)∈ ϕN :
(a) Let E ∈ΣS . We have θ
N(f(m)) = θ(m), so f(m) ∈EN iff m ∈EM .
(b) We have
f(m) ∈ (¬ϕ)N iff f(m) /∈ ϕN iff m /∈ ϕM iff m ∈ (¬ϕ)M .
(c) Let Ψ be a nonempty set of expressions with |Ψ|< κ. Then
f(m)∈
( ∧
ϕ∈Ψ
ϕ
)N
iff for all ϕ ∈Ψ:f(m)∈ ϕN ,
which is by the Induction hypothesis the case iff for all ϕ ∈ Ψ:m ∈ ϕM ,
which is the case iff m ∈ (
∧
ϕ∈Ψϕ)
M .
(d) We have
f(m) ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))
N iff TNi (f(m))(ϕ
N )≥ p iff Ti(m)(f
−1(ϕN ))≥ p.
By the Induction hypothesis: f−1(ϕN ) = ϕM . Hence Ti(m)(f
−1(ϕN )) =
Ti(m)(ϕ
M ). We have Ti(m)(ϕ
M )≥ p iff m ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))
M . It follows that
f(m) ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))
N iff m ∈ (Bpi (ϕ))
M . 
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Definition 13. Define Ωκ to be the set of all κ-descriptions of states
of the world in κ-type spaces on S for player set I . For ϕ ∈Φκ define
[ϕ] := {ω ∈Ωκ|ϕ ∈ ω}.
Again, we omit sometimes the superscript κ.
Remark 5. The set of κ-descriptions Ωκ is nonempty.
Proof. Let M := {m} and choose s ∈ S. Set Σ := Pow(M), Ti(m) :=
δm, for i ∈ I , and θ(m) := s. Then
〈M,Σ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉
is a κ-type space (even a ∗-type space) on S for player set I and hence
D(m) ∈Ωκ. 
Obviously, we have Ω \ [ϕ] = [¬ϕ] and
⋂
ψ∈Ψ[ψ] = [
∧
ψ∈Ψψ], where ϕ is
a κ-expression and Ψ is a nonempty set of κ-expressions with |Ψ| < κ. It
follows that:
Remark 6. The set
ΣΩ := {[ϕ]|ϕ ∈Φ
κ}
is a κ-field on Ω.
Lemma 4. For every κ-type space M on S for player set I and for every
ϕ ∈Φκ, the κ-description map D :M →Ω satisfies
D−1([ϕ]) = ϕM .
Proof. Clear by the definition of [ϕ]. 
Note that Lemma 4 implies that D is measurable.
Proposition 3. For every i ∈ I there exists a function
T ∗i :Ω→∆
κ(Ω,ΣΩ)
such that for every κ-type space M on S for player set I with κ-description
map D and every m ∈M :
T ∗i (D(m))(·) = Ti(m)(D
−1(·)).
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Proof. For ω ∈ Ω choose a κ-type space M on S for player set I and
m ∈M such that D(m) = ω. For [ϕ] ∈ΣΩ define
T ∗i (ω)([ϕ]) := Ti(m)(D
−1([ϕ])).
We have
Ti(m)(D
−1([ϕ])) = Ti(m)(ϕ
M ) = sup{p|Bpi (ϕ) ∈D(m)},
so T ∗i (ω)([ϕ]) depends just on D(m) and is well-defined. By Remark 2, we
have
Ti(m)(D
−1(·)) ∈∆κ(Ω,ΣΩ). 
Lemma 5. There is a measurable function θ∗ :Ω→ S such that for every
κ-type space M on S for player set I and every m ∈M :
θ∗(D(m)) = θ(m).
Proof. Let
d0(m) := {E ∈ΣS|m ∈ θ
−1(E)}.
Obviously, d0(m) =D(m) ∩ ΣS . By the properties of (S,ΣS), we have for
all s ∈ S :{s} =
⋂
s∈E∈ΣS
E. It follows for every κ-type space M ′ on S for
player set I and m′ ∈M ′ that
θ(m′) = s iff d0(m
′) = {E|s ∈E}.
For ω ∈ Ω choose a κ-type space M on S for player set I and m ∈M ,
such that D(m) = ω. Define now θ∗(ω) := θ(m). Since θ(m) just depends on
D(m), θ∗(ω) is well-defined.
It remains to show that θ∗ is measurable: Let E ∈ΣS . We have
θ∗(D(m)) ∈E iff m ∈ θ−1(E) iff E ∈D(m) iff D(m) ∈ [E].
It follows that θ∗−1(E) = [E]. 
Proposition 4.
〈Ω,ΣΩ, (T
∗
i )i∈I , θ
∗〉
is a κ-type space on S for player set I.
Proof. It remains to show:
1. For every i ∈ I :T ∗i is measurable as a function from Ω to ∆
κ(Ω,ΣΩ).
2. For every i ∈ I , ω ∈Ω and A ∈ΣΩ: If
{ω′ ∈Ω|T ∗i (ω
′) = T ∗i (ω)} ⊆A,
then T ∗i (ω)(A) = 1.
16 M. MEIER
1. Since inverse images commute with unions, intersections and comple-
ments, it is enough to show that T ∗−1i (b
p(E)) ∈ΣΩ, for
bp(E) := {µ ∈∆κ(Ω,ΣΩ)|µ(E)≥ p},
where E ∈ΣΩ and p ∈ [0,1]. We have
T ∗−1i (b
p(E)) = {ω ∈Ω|T ∗i (ω)(E)≥ p}.
Since E ∈ ΣΩ, there is a κ-expression ϕ such that E = [ϕ]. Note that if
p ∈ [0,1] and p= sup{q|Bqi (ϕ) ∈ ω}, then B
p
i (ϕ) ∈ ω. This implies that
ω ∈ T ∗−1i (b
p([ϕ])) iff Bpi (ϕ) ∈ ω.
It follows that T ∗−1i (b
p(E)) = [Bpi (ϕ)].
2. Let ϕ be a κ-expression and
{ω′ ∈Ω|T ∗i (ω
′) = T ∗i (ω)} ⊆ [ϕ].
Choose a κ-type spaceM on S for player set I andm ∈M such that D(m) =
ω. Let m′ ∈M . If T ∗i (D(m
′)) 6= T ∗i (D(m)), then there is a κ-expression ψ
such that Ti(m
′)(ψM ) 6= Ti(m)(ψ
M ). It follows that
D({m′ ∈M |Ti(m
′) = Ti(m)})⊆ {ω
′ ∈Ω|T ∗i (ω
′) = T ∗i (ω)},
which implies
{m′ ∈M |Ti(m
′) = Ti(m)} ⊆D
−1([ϕ]) = ϕM .
So we have
1 = Ti(m)(ϕ
M ) = Ti(m)(D
−1([ϕ])) = T ∗i (ω)([ϕ]). 
Lemma 6. The κ-description map
D :Ω→Ω
is the identity.
Proof. For ω ∈Ω, we have
ω = {ϕ ∈Φ|ω ∈ [ϕ]}.
We have to show that for every κ-expression ϕ and every ω ∈ Ω:ω ∈ ϕΩ
iff ω ∈ [ϕ]. We know this already if ϕ = E, where E ∈ ΣS . It is obvious
that Ω \ [ϕ] = [¬ϕ], and that if Ψ is a nonempty set of κ-expressions of
cardinality < κ, then ⋂
ϕ∈Ψ
[ϕ] =
[ ∧
ϕ∈Ψ
ϕ
]
.
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So it remains to show that [ϕ] = ϕΩ implies [Bpi (ϕ)] =B
p
i ([ϕ]). For ω ∈ Ω,
choose a κ-type spaceM on S for player set I and m ∈M such that D(m) =
ω. We have
D(m) ∈ [Bpi (ϕ)] iff B
p
i (ϕ) ∈D(m) iff Ti(m)(ϕ
M )≥ p.
But we have
T ∗i (ω)([ϕ]) = Ti(m)D
−1([ϕ]) = Ti(m)(ϕ
M ).
This implies that [Bpi (ϕ)] =B
p
i ([ϕ]). 
Theorem 1. The space
〈Ω,ΣΩ, (T
∗
i )i∈I , θ
∗〉
is a universal κ-type space on S for player set I.
Proof. According to Lemma 4, for every κ-type space M on S for
player set I , the κ-description map D :M →Ω is measurable, and according
to Proposition 3 and Lemma 5, D is a type morphism. It remains to show
that it is the unique type morphism from M to Ω. But this is clear by
Proposition 2 and Lemma 6. 
5. Spaces of arbitrary complexity. Is there a cardinal κ, such that the
κ-descriptions determine already the κ′-descriptions, for all cardinal num-
bers κ′ > κ? In the sequel, using a probabilistic adaptation of the elegant
“sober-drunk” example of Heifetz and Samet [9] (see that paper also for the
“story” interpreting the mathematical structure), we construct, for every
regular cardinal κ′, a κ′-type space (in fact even a ∗-type space), such that
for every ordinal α < κ′ there are at least two states of the world such that
for every κ′-expression of depth ≤ α this κ′-expression is true either in both
states or in neither of the two, and yet there is a κ′-expression of depth
α+ 1 that is true in one state and not in the other. Thus, choosing α and
κ′ with κ ≤ α < α+ 1 < κ′, we answer the above question in the negative.
Hence, it makes sense to consider κ-type spaces for every regular cardinality
κ whatsoever.
On top of that, this example will imply that, for at least two players
and at least two states of nature, there is no universal ∗-type space and no
universal ∞-type space (Theorem 4 and Corollary 1).
For this section, let I := {a, b} be the set of players (the following analysis
can be trivially extended to more than two players). We fix a set of states of
nature S = {h, t}, consisting of the two possible outcomes of tossing a coin,
h(ead) and t(ail).
To simplify the notation let us make the following
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Convention 2. {i, j} := {a, b}, that is,
j =
{
a, if i= b,
b, if i= a.
The following three definitions and Definition 19 are taken from Heifetz
and Samet [9].
Definition 14. Let α ≥ 1 be an ordinal. A record of length α is a
sequence rα = (r(β))β<α of numbers “0” and “1” such that for every limit
ordinal λ≤ α there is an ordinal γ < λ such that r(β) = 0 for all ordinals β
that satisfy γ ≤ β < λ.
For every infinite ordinal γ there are a unique natural number n and a
unique limit ordinal λ̂ such that γ = λ̂+n. We say γ is even or odd according
to whether n is even or odd. If γ is a finite ordinal, that is, a natural number,
we take the usual notion of being even or odd.
Definition 15. Let α be an ordinal, rα a record of length α and λ a
limit ordinal ≤ α. By the definition of a record, there is a minimal ordinal
oλ(rα)< λ such that rα(β) = 0, for all β with oλ(rα)≤ β < λ.
Define λ− par(rα), the λ-parity of rα, as
λ− par(rα) :=
{
even, if oλ(rα) is even,
odd, if oλ(rα) is odd.
Note that by the definition of a record, oλ(rα) must be either 0 or a
successor ordinal [i.e., oλ(rα) = γ +1, for some ordinal γ].
Definition 16. Let α be an ordinal. Define the spaces Wα by:
(i) W 0 := {h, t},
(ii) Wα := {(w0,w
α
a ,w
α
b )|w0 ∈ {h, t},w
α
a and w
α
b are records of length α},
if α≥ 1.
Definition 17. (i) If 0< β ≤ α and rα = (r(ξ))ξ<α is a record of length
α, then denote by rα⌈β the record (r(ξ))ξ<β of length β.
(ii) If 0≤ α and wα ∈Wα, then define wα⌈0 :=w0.
(iii) If 0< β ≤ α and wα ∈Wα, then define wα⌈β := (w0,w
α
a ⌈β,w
α
b ⌈β).
By the definition, it is obvious that wα⌈β ∈W β, for every β < α.
Definition 18. Let 0≤ β ≤ α. Define
piβ,α :W
α→W β
by piβ,α(w
α) :=wα⌈β.
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It is obvious that piξ,β(piβ,α(w
α)) = piξ,α(w
α), for 0≤ ξ ≤ β ≤ α.
Remark 7. Let 0≤ β < α, wβ ∈W β, and i ∈ {a, b}. Then there are wα,
uα ∈Wα such that
wα⌈β = uα⌈β =wβ and 0 =wαi (β) 6= u
α
i (β) = 1.
In particular, it follows that piβ,α :W
α→W β is onto.
We define for each player i a partition of the space Wα. Two states are
in the same element of player i’s partition if he cannot distinguish them.
That is, he has the same information (the same beliefs) in both states.
Let wα = (w0,w
α
a ,w
α
b ) be a state in W
α. The element of i’s partition that
contains this state is defined as follows:
Definition 19. Let α be an ordinal > 0 and wα ∈Wα. We define:
Pi(w
α) := {(v0, v
α
a , v
α
b ) ∈W
α|vαi =w
α
i ,
wαi (0) = 1 implies v0 =w0,
for all β such that β +1<α :
wαi (β + 1) = 1 implies v
α
j (β) =w
α
j (β),
for every limit ordinal λ < α :
wαi (λ) = 1 implies λ− par(v
α
j ) = λ− par(w
α
j )}.
Remark 8. (i) Let α be an ordinal > 0. The set {Pi(w
α)|wα ∈Wα} is
a partition of Wα and wα ∈ Pi(w
α).
(ii) Let 0 < β < α and uα ∈ Pi(w
α). Then uα⌈β ∈ Pi(w
α⌈β), and hence
pi−1β,α(Pi(w
α⌈β))⊇ Pi(w
α).
It is easy to see that if α is an infinite ordinal number, then the cardinality
of Wα is the same as the cardinality of α. [To see that, in the case of an
infinite α, the cardinality of Wα does not exceed that of α, note that the
definition of a record implies that there are only finitely many β < α such
that rα(β) = 1. Consider, assuming the contrary, the minimal γ ≤ α such
that there are infinitely many β < γ with rα(β) = 1.] Therefore, we have:
Remark 9. Let κ be an infinite cardinal number. Then |W κ|= κ.
Notation 2. (a) For 0≤ α and w0 ∈ {h, t}, we denote by [X
α
0 =w0] the
set {uα ∈Wα|u0 =w0}.
(b) For β < α, i ∈ {a, b} and wαi (β) ∈ {0,1}, we denote by [X
α
i (β) =
wαi (β)] the set {u
α ∈Wα|uαi (β) =w
α
i (β)}.
(c) For a limit ordinal λ≤ α and λ−par(wαi ) ∈ {even, odd}, we denote by
[λ− par(Xαi ) = λ− par(w
α
i )] the set {u
α ∈Wα|λ− par(uαi ) = λ− par(w
α
i )}.
20 M. MEIER
Remark 10. Let 0≤ α≤ γ and w0 ∈ {h, t}. Then:
(i) pi−1α,γ([X
α
0 =w0]) = [X
γ
0 =w0].
(ii) If β < α, i ∈ {a, b} and wγ ∈W γ , then
wγi (β) = (w
γ
i ⌈α)(β)
and
pi−1α,γ([X
α
i (β) = (w
γ
i ⌈α)(β)]) = [X
γ
i (β) =w
γ
i (β)].
(iii) If i ∈ {a, b}, wγ ∈W γ , and if λ is a limit ordinal such that λ ≤ α,
then
λ− par(wγi ) = λ− par(w
γ
i ⌈α)
and
pi−1α,γ([λ− par(X
α
i ) = λ− par(w
γ
i ⌈α)]) = [λ− par(X
γ
i ) = λ− par(w
γ
i )].
Now, let κ be a fixed regular cardinal.
Theorem 2. For i ∈ {a, b}, there is a function Ti :W
κ −→∆(W κ,Pow(W κ))
with the following properties:
(a) Ti(u
κ) = Ti(w
κ), for uκ ∈ Pi(w
κ),
(b) Ti(w
κ)(Pi(w
κ)) = 1,
(c) Ti(w
κ)([Xκ0 =w0]) =
{
1, if wκi (0) = 1,
1
2 , if w
κ
i (0) = 0,
(d) for β < κ:
Ti(w
κ)([Xκj (β) =w
κ
j (β)]) =
{
1, if wκi (β +1) = 1,
1
2 , if w
κ
i (β +1) = 0,
(e) for λ < κ such that λ is a limit ordinal:
Ti(w
κ)([λ− par(Xκj ) = λ− par(w
κ
j )]) =
{
1, if wκi (λ) = 1,
1
2 , if w
κ
i (λ) = 0,
(f ) for 0≤ β < α < κ and uκ,wκ ∈W κ: if Eβ ⊆W β and uκ⌈α = wκ⌈α,
then
Ti(u
κ)(pi−1β,κ(E
β)) = Ti(w
κ)(pi−1β,κ(E
β)).
Theorem 2 will be proved in Section 6.
Remark 11. For wκ ∈W κ, define
θ(wκ) :=w0.
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From the first two points of Theorem 2 and the fact that Ti(w
κ) is a finitely
additive probability measure defined on (W κ,Pow(W κ)), it follows that
〈W κ, (Ti)i∈{a,b}, θ〉
is a ∗-type space on S = {h, t} for player set {a, b}.
Next, by induction on the formation of κ-expressions, we define the depth
of a κ-expression. The depth of a κ-expression is an ordinal number that
measures how complex that expression is with respect to the players’ beliefs
operators.
Definition 20. (i) If E ∈ΣS , then dp(E) := 0,
(ii) if 0≤ p≤ 1, i ∈ I and if ϕ is a κ-expression, then
dp(Bpi (ϕ)) := dp(ϕ) + 1,
(iii) if ϕ is a κ-expression, then dp(¬ϕ) := dp(ϕ),
(iv) if Ψ is a set of κ-expressions such that |Ψ|<κ, then
dp
( ∧
ϕ∈Ψ
ϕ
)
:= sup{dp(ϕ)|ϕ ∈Ψ}.
It is easy to see that, since κ is regular, the depth of a κ-expression is
always strictly smaller than κ.
The following Lemmas 7–9 will be proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 7. Let α≤ κ, wκ, uκ ∈W κ and wκ⌈α= uκ⌈α.
Then, for all κ-expressions ϕ such that dp(ϕ)≤ α:
wκ ∈ ϕW
κ
iff uκ ∈ ϕW
κ
.
Lemma 8. In the ∗-type space 〈W κ, (Ti)i∈{a,b}, θ〉, we have:
[Xκi (0) = 1] =B
1
i ([X
κ
0 = h]) ∪B
1
i ([X
κ
0 = t]),
[Xκi (β +1) = 1] =B
1
i ([X
κ
j (β) = 1]) ∪B
1
i ([X
κ
j (β) = 0])
for all ordinals β < κ,
[Xκi (λ) = 1] =B
1
i ([λ− par(X
κ
j ) = even]) ∪B
1
i ([λ− par(X
κ
j ) = odd])
for all limit ordinals λ < κ.
Lemma 9. In the ∗-type space 〈W κ, (Ti)i∈{a,b}, θ〉, we have:
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(i)
{h}W
κ
= [Xκ0 = h],
{t}W
κ
= [Xκ0 = t],
dp({h}) = dp({t}) = 0.
(ii) For every i ∈ {a, b} and β such that 0≤ β < κ, there are κ-expressions
ϕ0i (β) and ϕ
1
i (β) with
dp(ϕ0i (β)) = dp(ϕ
1
i (β)) = β +1
such that
(ϕ1i (β))
Wκ = [Xκi (β) = 1]
and
(ϕ0i (β))
Wκ = [Xκi (β) = 0].
(iii) For every i ∈ {a, b} and limit ordinal λ < κ, there are κ-expressions
ϕeveni (λ) and ϕ
odd
i (λ) with
dp(ϕeveni (λ)) = dp(ϕ
odd
i (λ)) = λ
such that
(ϕeveni (λ))
Wκ = [λ− par(Xκi ) = even]
and
(ϕoddi (λ))
Wκ = [λ− par(Xκi ) = odd].
Theorem 3. For every ordinal α < κ there are uκ,wκ ∈W κ such that:
1. For all κ-expressions ϕ with dp(ϕ)≤ α:
uκ ∈ ϕW
κ
iff wκ ∈ ϕW
κ
.
2. There is a κ-expression ψ with dp(ψ) = α+1 such that
uκ ∈ ψW
κ
and wκ ∈ (¬ψ)W
κ
.
Proof. Let α < κ and i ∈ {a, b}. By the definition of W κ, there are
uκ, wκ ∈W κ such that uκ⌈α= wκ⌈α and 1 = uκi (α) 6= w
κ
i (α) = 0. The first
point follows now by Lemma 7. By Lemma 9, it follows that uκ ∈ ϕ1i (α)
Wκ ,
wκ ∈ (¬ϕ1i (α))
Wκ , and dp(ϕ1i (α)) = α+1. 
Note that Lemma 7 and the proof of Theorem 3 show that u0 and the
levels up to and including level α of uκi and of u
κ
j determine which of the
κ-expressions of depth α+1 belong to the κ-description of uκ.
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Theorem 4. Let |I| ≥ 2 and |S| ≥ 2. Then, there is no weak-universal
∞-type space on S for player set I and there is no weak-universal ∗-type
space on S for player set I.
Proof. Assume there is a weak-universal∞-type space (a weak-universal
∗-type space, resp.)
U = 〈U,Σ, (TUi )i∈I , θ
U〉
on S for player set I . Then, the underlying set U has a cardinality |U |. There
is a regular cardinal number κ > |U |.
Wκ = 〈W κ, (Ti)i∈{a,b}, θ〉
is a ∗-type space on {h, t} (and therefore a∞-type space). Since |{h, t}|= 2,
we can assume without loss of generality that {h, t} ⊆ S, and since ΣS =
Pow(S), that ΣS ⊇ Pow({h, t}). Also, since |I| ≥ 2, we can assume without
loss of generality that {a, b} ⊆ I . For i ∈ I \ {a, b} define Ti(w
κ) := δwκ , and
view θ as a function from W κ to S. Then
W κI := 〈W
κ, (Ti)i∈I , θ〉
is a ∗-type space on S (with player set I). Since every ∗-type space is a ∞-
type space, WκI is also a ∞-type space. According to the assumption, there
is a type morphism f :W κ→ U . Since both spaces are in particular κ-type
spaces, this morphism preserves κ-descriptions. If ϕ is a κ-expression in the
“language” corresponding to the set of states of nature {h, t} and the player
set {a, b}, then ϕ is also a κ-expression in the “language” corresponding to
the set of states of nature S and the player set I , and it is easy to check
that for wκ ∈W κ we have wκ ∈ ϕW
κ
I iff wκ ∈ ϕW
κ
. So, by Lemma 9, it is
still the case that two different states of WκI have different κ-descriptions.
Hence, since by Proposition 2, f preserves κ-descriptions, f is one-to-one.
It follows that |U | ≥ |W κ|= κ, which is a contradiction to |U |< κ. 
Corollary 1. Let |I| ≥ 2 and |S| ≥ 2. Then there is no universal ∞-
type space on S for player set I and there is no universal ∗-type space on S
for player set I.
6. Construction of the Ti’s. This section is devoted to the proof of The-
orem 2, that is, the construction of the Ti’s mentioned there. Lemmas
10 and 12–17 needed for this construction are proved at the end of this
section.
The construction will not be carried out at once. By a transfinite induc-
tion on 1≤ α≤ κ, we endow Wα with fields F(i,wα) and finitely additive
probability measures Tαi (w
α) on (Wα,F(i,wα)) such that the following In-
duction hypothesis is satisfied:
Induction hypothesis (for α).
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1. F(i,wα) := [
⋃
β<α(pi
−1
β,α(Pow(W
β))), Pi(w
α)].
2. For every ordinal β with 1≤ β < α and every Eβ ∈F(i,wα⌈β):
Tαi (w
α)(pi−1β,α(E
β)) = T βi (w
α⌈β)(Eβ),
that is, marg(W β ,F(i,wα⌈β)) T
α
i (w
α) = T βi (w
α⌈β).
3. Tαi (w
α) = Tαi (u
α) for uα ∈ Pi(w
α).
4. Tαi (w
α)(Pi(w
α)) = 1.
5. Tαi (w
α)([Xα0 =w0]) =
{
1, if wαi (0) = 1,
1
2 , if w
α
i (0) = 0.
6. For β such that β +1< α:
Tαi (w
α)([Xαj (β) =w
α
j (β)]) =
{
1, if wαi (β +1) = 1,
1
2 , if w
α
i (β +1) = 0.
7. For λ < α such that λ is a limit ordinal:
Tαi (w
α)([λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(w
α
j )]) =
{
1, if wαi (λ) = 1,
1
2 , if w
α
i (λ) = 0.
Let 1 ≤ γ ≤ α. Then
⋃
β<γ pi
−1
β,α(Pow(W
β)) is a field on Wα. Hence, by
definition, F(i,wα) is also a field on Wα. Since inverse images commute
with complements, arbitrary unions and intersections, we have:
Remark 12. Let 1≤ γ ≤ α. Then,
pi−1γ,α(F(i,w
γ)) =
[ ⋃
β<γ
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
γ))
]
is a field on Wα. In particular,
pi−1β+1,α(F(i,w
α⌈β +1)) = [pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β + 1))]
is a field on Wα, for β+1≤ α. Note also that pi−1γ,α(F(i,w
α⌈γ))⊆F(i,wα),
for 1≤ γ ≤ α.
Remark 13. Let 1 ≤ β ≤ α ≤ κ and let uα,wα ∈Wα such that uα ∈
Pi(w
α) [and hence Pi(u
α) = Pi(w
α)]. Then:
(a) We have
F(i,wα) = F(i, uα),
F(i,wα⌈β) = F(i, uα⌈β).
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(b) If
Tαi (w
α) = Tαi (u
α),
T βi (w
α⌈β) = T βi (u
α⌈β),
marg(W β ,F(i,wα⌈β)) T
α
i (w
α) = T βi (w
α⌈β),
then we obviously also have
marg(W β ,F(i,uα⌈β)) T
α
i (u
α) = T βi (u
α⌈β).
Before we begin the construction of the Ti’s, we have to provide some
lemmas that are needed to carry out this construction. These lemmas will
guarantee that the induction can be done maintaining the conditions 1–7 of
the Induction hypothesis. They will be proved at the end of this section.
Lemma 10. Let γ be an ordinal > 0, α= γ +1, wα ∈Wα, and
E ∈
[[ ⋃
β<γ
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ))
]
, Pi(w
α)
]
.
Then there are a β < γ and Aβ,Cβ,Dβ ∈ Pow(W
β) such that
E = (pi−1β,α(Aβ)∩Pi(w
α))∪ (pi−1β,α(Cβ)∩ pi
−1
γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi(w
α)))
∪ (pi−1β,α(Dβ)∩ (W
α \ pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)))).
For further reference, we cite here (in a slightly changed formulation and
in our notation) Lemma 3.2 of [9]:
Lemma 11. Let vα,wα ∈Wα, where vα⌈γ +1 ∈ Pi(w
α⌈γ +1), for some
γ < α. Then there is a uα ∈ Pi(w
α) such that uα⌈γ = vα⌈γ.
Lemma 12. Let λ be a limit ordinal, α = λ + 1, wα ∈Wα, wαi (λ) = 0
and E = pi−1β,α(Eβ), where Eβ ⊆W
β for a β < λ. Then:
(a) If vα ∈ E ∩ Pi(w
α), then there is a uα ∈ E ∩ Pi(w
α) such that
λ− par(uαj ) 6= λ− par(v
α
j ).
(b) If vα ∈ E ∩ pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi(w
α)), then there is a uα ∈
E ∩ pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi(w
α)) such that λ− par(uαj ) 6= λ− par(v
α
j ).
(c) If vα ∈ E ∩ (Wα \ pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ))), then there is a uα ∈ E ∩ (Wα \
pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ))) such that λ− par(uαj ) 6= λ− par(v
α
j ).
Lemma 13. Let β be an ordinal, α= (β+1)+1, wα ∈Wα, wαi (β+1) = 0
and E = pi−1β,α(Eβ), such that Eβ ⊆W
β . Then:
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(a) If vα ∈E∩Pi(w
α), then there is a uα ∈E∩Pi(w
α) such that uαj (β) 6=
vαj (β).
(b) If vα ∈ E ∩ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β + 1)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi(w
α)), then there is a
uα ∈E ∩ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β + 1))∩ (Wα \ Pi(w
α)) such that uαj (β) 6= v
α
j (β).
(c) If vα ∈ E ∩ (Wα \ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β + 1))), then there is a uα ∈ E ∩
(Wα \ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β +1))) such that uαj (β) 6= v
α
j (β).
Lemma 14. Let λ be a limit ordinal, α = λ + 1, wα ∈Wα, wαi (λ) = 0
and
E ∈
[[ ⋃
β<λ
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ))
]
, Pi(w
α)
]
.
Then:
(a) If vα ∈E, then there is a uα ∈E such that λ−par(uαj ) 6= λ−par(v
α
j ).
(b) If vα ∈Wα \E, then there is a uα ∈Wα \E such that λ−par(uαj ) 6=
λ− par(vαj ).
(c) If E ⊇ [λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(w
α
j )], then E =W
α.
(d) If E ⊆ [λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(w
α
j )], then E =∅.
Lemma 15. Let β be an ordinal, α= (β+1)+1, wα ∈Wα, wαi (β+1) = 0
and
E ∈ [[pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β +1))], Pi(w
α)].
Then:
(a) If vα ∈E, then there is a uα ∈E such that uαj (β) 6= v
α
j (β).
(b) If vα ∈Wα \E, then there is a uα ∈Wα \E such that uαj (β) 6= v
α
j (β).
(c) If E ⊇ [Xαj (β) =w
α
j (β)], then E =W
α.
(d) If E ⊆ [Xαj (β) =w
α
j (β)], then E =∅.
Lemma 16. Let γ be an ordinal > 0, α= γ +1, wα ∈Wα and
E ∈
[ ⋃
β<γ
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ))
]
such that E ⊇ Pi(w
α). Then
E ⊇ pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)).
Lemma 17. Let λ be a limit ordinal, wλ ∈W λ, β < λ and Eβ ⊆W β
such that pi−1β,λ(E
β)⊇ Pi(w
λ). Then pi−1β,λ(E
β)⊇ pi−1β+1,λ(Pi(w
λ⌈β + 1)).
Proof of Theorem 2. We construct the Ti’s by transfinite induction
on 1 ≤ α ≤ κ, such that the conditions 1–7 of the Induction hypothesis at
the beginning of this section are satisfied:
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Step α= 1. We have W 0 = {h, t}. Let w1 ∈W 1. Define
T<1i (w
1)([X10 =w0]) :=
{
1, if w1i (0) = 1,
1
2 , if w
1
i (0) = 0,
T<1i (w
1)([X10 6=w0]) := 1− T
<1
i (w
1)([X10 =w0]),
T<1i (w
1)(∅) := 0,
T<1i (w
1)(W 1) := 1.
It is clear that by this definition, T<1i (w
1) is a probability measure on
(W 1, pi−10,1(Pow(W
0))).
Let E0 ⊆W 0 such that Pi(w
1)⊆ pi−10,1(E
0).
1. Case: w1i (0) = 1. Then E
0 = W 0 or E0 = [X00 = w0], hence the outer
measure T<1i (w
1)∗(Pi(w
1)) is equal to 1.
2. Case: w1i (0) = 0. Then E
0 =W 0 and the outer measure T<1i (w
1)∗(Pi(w
1))
is equal to 1.
For u1 ∈ Pi(w
1), we have in both cases that Pi(u
1) = Pi(w
1) and T<1i (u
1) =
T<1i (w
1). For each Pi(u
1) such that u1 ∈W 1, choose a representing ele-
ment w1 ∈ Pi(u
1) = Pi(w
1). By the  Los´–Marczewski theorem, we can extend
T<1i (w
1) to a finitely additive probability measure T 1i (w
1) on the field
F(i,w1) = [pi−10,1(Pow(W
0)), Pi(w
1)]
such that T 1i (w
1)(Pi(w
1)) = 1. Define T 1i (u
1) := T 1i (w
1), for all u1 ∈ Pi(w
1).
Note that F(i, u1) =F(i,w1), for u1 ∈ Pi(w
1). T 1i (u
1) and F(i, u1) satisfy
the conditions 1–7 of the Induction hypothesis.
Step α= (β+1)+1, for 0≤ β < κ. For each Pi(u
α) such that uα ∈Wα,
choose a representing element wα ∈ Pi(u
α) = Pi(w
α).
Let T<αi (w
α) be the finitely additive probability measure defined on the
field
pi−1β+1,α(F(i,w
α⌈β + 1)) = [pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β +1))],
which is induced by T β+1i (w
α⌈β+1) (as defined in Lemma 1). According to
Lemma 16 and the Induction hypothesis, we have for the outer measure of
Pi(w
α) :T<αi (w
α)∗(Pi(w
α)) = 1. So, by the  Los´–Marczewski theorem, we can
extend T<αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure T˜αi (w
α) defined
on the field
F˜(i,wα) := [[pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β + 1))], Pi(w
α)]
such that T˜αi (w
α)(Pi(w
α)) = 1.
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1. Case: wαi (β + 1) = 1. Then
pi−1β+1,α([X
β+1
j (β) = (w
α
j ⌈β + 1)(β)]) = [X
α
j (β) =w
α
j (β)]⊇ Pi(w
α).
By Lemma 3, extend T˜αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure
Tαi (w
α) on the field
[pi−1β+1,α(Pow(W
β+1)), Pi(w
α)] =F(i,wα).
By the above, we have
Tαi (w
α)([Xαj (β) =w
α
j (β)]) = 1.
Define now Tαi (u
α) := Tαi (w
α), for all uα ∈ Pi(w
α). Note that, for uα ∈
Pi(w
α), we have F˜(i, uα) = F˜(i,wα), F(i, uα) =F(i,wα) and uαi (β+1) =
wαi (β + 1) = 1 and hence, u
α
j (β) = w
α
j (β). It is now easy to check that
Tαi (u
α) and F(i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1–7 of the Induction hypoth-
esis.
2. Case: wαi (β + 1) = 0. By Lemma 15 and the Induction hypothesis, we
have for the outer measure of [Xαj (β) =w
α
j (β)]:
T˜αi (w
α)∗([Xαj (β) =w
α
j (β)]) = 1,
and for the inner measure
T˜αi (w
α)∗([X
α
j (β) =w
α
j (β)]) = 0.
By the  Los´–Marczewski theorem, we can extend T˜αi (w
α) to a finitely
additive probability measure T̂αi (w
α) on the field
[F˜(i,wα), [Xαj (β) =w
α
j (β)]]
such that
T̂αi (w
α)([Xαj (β) =w
α
j (β)]) =
1
2 .
Finally, by Lemma 3, extend T̂αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability
measure Tαi (w
α) on F(i,wα). Define now Tαi (u
α) := Tαi (w
α), for all uα ∈
Pi(w
α). It is easy to check that Tαi (u
α) and F(i, uα) satisfy the conditions
1–7 of the Induction hypothesis.
Step α= λ, λ limit ordinal. For each Pi(u
α) such that uα ∈Wα, choose
a representing element wα ∈ Pi(u
α) = Pi(w
α).
Let T<αi (w
α) be the finitely additive probability measure defined on the
field ⋃
β<α
pi−1β,α(F(i,w
α⌈β)) =
⋃
β<α
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β))
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which is induced by (T βi (w
α⌈β))1≤β<α (as defined in Lemma 1).
Let β < α and Eβ ⊆W β such that pi−1β,α(E
β)⊇ Pi(w
α). By Lemma 17, we
have
pi−1β,α(E
β)⊇ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β + 1)).
(Note that β < α implies β +1<α.) Since, by the definition of T<αi (w
α),
T<αi (w
α)(pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β +1))) = T β+1i (w
α⌈β +1)(Pi(w
α⌈β +1)) = 1,
the outer measure T<αi (w
α)∗(Pi(w
α)) is equal to 1. By the  Los´–Marczewski
theorem, we can extend T<αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure
Tαi (w
α) on the field
F(i,wα) =
[ ⋃
β<α
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), Pi(w
α)
]
such that Tαi (w
α)(Pi(w
α)) = 1. For uα ∈ Pi(w
α) define Tαi (u
α) := Tαi (w
α).
It is easy to check that Tαi (u
α) and F(i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1–7 of
the Induction hypothesis.
Step α = λ + 1, λ limit ordinal. For each Pi(u
α) such that uα ∈Wα,
choose a representing element wα ∈ Pi(u
α) = Pi(w
α).
Let T<αi (w
α) be the finitely additive probability measure defined on the
field
pi−1λ,α(F(i,w
α⌈λ)) =
[ ⋃
β<λ
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ))
]
,
which is induced by T λi (w
α⌈λ) (as defined in Lemma 1). According to
Lemma 16 and the Induction hypothesis, we have for the outer measure
of Pi(w
α) :T<αi (w
α)∗(Pi(w
α)) = 1. So, by the  Los´–Marczewski theorem, we
can extend T<αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure T˜αi (w
α) de-
fined on the field
F˜(i,wα) :=
[[ ⋃
β<λ
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ))
]
, Pi(w
α)
]
,
such that T˜αi (w
α)(Pi(w
α)) = 1.
1. Case: wαi (λ) = 1. Then
pi−1λ,α([λ− par(X
λ
j ) = λ− par(w
α
j ⌈λ)]) = [λ− par(X
α
j ) = λ− par(w
α
j )]
⊇ Pi(w
α).
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By Lemma 3, extend T˜αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability measure
Tαi (w
α) on the field
[pi−1λ,α(Pow(W
λ)), Pi(w
α)] =F(i,wα).
By the above, we have
Tαi (w
α)([λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(w
α
j )]) = 1.
Define now Tαi (u
α) := Tαi (w
α), for all uα ∈ Pi(w
α). [Note that F(i, uα) =
F(i,wα), uαi (λ) =w
α
i (λ) = 1 and hence, λ− par(w
α
j ) = λ− par(u
α
j ).] It is
now easy to check that Tαi (u
α) and F(i, uα) satisfy the conditions 1–7 of
the Induction hypothesis.
2. Case: wαi (λ) = 0. By Lemma 14, we have for the outer measure of [λ−
par(Xαj ) = λ− par(w
α
j )]:
T˜αi (w
α)∗([λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(w
α
j )]) = 1,
and for the inner measure
T˜αi (w
α)∗([λ− par(X
α
j ) = λ− par(w
α
j )]) = 0.
By the  Los´–Marczewski theorem, we can extend T˜αi (w
α) to a finitely
additive probability measure T̂αi (w
α) on the field
[F˜(i,wα), [λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(w
α
j )]]
such that
T̂αi (w
α)([λ− par(Xαj ) = λ− par(w
α
j )]) =
1
2 .
Finally, by Lemma 3, extend T̂αi (w
α) to a finitely additive probability
measure Tαi (w
α) on F(i,wα). Define now Tαi (u
α) := Tαi (w
α), for all uα ∈
Pi(w
α). It is easy to check that Tαi (u
α) and F(i, uα) satisfy the conditions
1–7 of the Induction hypothesis.
Remaining step. To finish the proof of Theorem 2, we have to extend
T κi (u
κ) to a finitely additive probability measure Ti(u
κ) defined on the field
Pow(W κ) such that Ti(u
κ) = Ti(w
κ), for uκ ∈ Pi(w
κ).
By the inductive construction, T κi (u
κ) is defined on[ ⋃
β<κ
pi−1β,κ(Pow(W
β)), Pi(w
κ)
]
such that the conditions 1–7 of the Induction hypothesis are satisfied for
α= κ. For each Pi(u
κ) such that uκ ∈W κ, choose a representing element
wκ ∈ Pi(u
κ) = Pi(w
κ).
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By Lemma 3, extend T κi (w
κ) to a finitely additive probability measure
Ti(w
κ) on the field Pow(W κ) and define
Ti(u
κ) := Ti(w
κ),
for uκ ∈ Pi(w
κ). By construction and the Induction hypothesis for α = κ,
the function Ti :W
κ→∆(W κ,Pow(W κ)) has all the desired properties, and
hence Theorem 2 is proved. 
6.1. Proofs of Lemmas 10 and 12–17.
Proof of Lemma 10. By the definition of[[ ⋃
β<γ
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ))
]
, Pi(w
α)
]
,
E has the form
E = (((pi−1β,α(Aβ)∩ pi
−1
γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)))
∪ (pi−1η,α(Bη)∩ (W
α \ pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)))))∩ Pi(w
α))
∪ (((pi−1ξ,α(Cξ)∩ pi
−1
γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)))
∪ (pi−1ζ,α(Dζ)∩ (W
α \ pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)))))∩ (Wα \ Pi(w
α))),
where β, η, ξ, ζ < γ and Aβ ⊆W
β,Bη ⊆W
η, Cξ ⊆W
ξ, Dζ ⊆W
ζ .
The lemma follows from the following facts: If η < β, then pi−1η,β(Bη)⊆W
β
and pi−1η,α(Bη) = pi
−1
β,α(pi
−1
η,β(Bη)), so we can assume without loss of generality
that β = η = ξ = ζ . By Remark 8, we have Pi(w
α)⊆ pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)). 
Proof of Lemma 12. Let vα ∈ E. Since β, oλ(vαi ), o
λ(vαj ) < λ, there
is an ordinal ξ such that max{β, oλ(vαi ), o
λ(vαj )} ≤ ξ < λ and such that the
parity of ξ + 1 is different from λ− par(vαj ). Define now u
α ∈Wα by
u0 := v0,
uαi := v
α
i ,
uαj (γ) := v
α
j (γ) for all γ < α with γ 6= ξ,
uαj (ξ) := 1.
It follows that λ− par(uαj ) 6= λ− par(v
α
j ) and u
α⌈β = vα⌈β, which implies
uα ∈E.
(a) If vα ∈ Pi(w
α), then it is easy to check that uα ∈ Pi(v
α) = Pi(w
α).
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(b) If vα ∈ pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi(w
α)), then it follows that
vα ∈ pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ)) and vαi (λ) = 1. It is again easy to check that u
α ∈
pi−1λ,α(Pi(v
α⌈λ)) = pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ)) and since uαi (λ) = 1, we have u
α ∈ (Wα \
Pi(w
α)).
(c) If vα /∈ pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ)), then there are four cases:
1. vαi ⌈λ 6=w
α
i ⌈λ. From u
α
i ⌈λ= v
α
i ⌈λ it follows that u
α /∈ pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ)).
2. There is a γ < λ such that
(vαi ⌈λ)(γ +1) = (w
α
i ⌈λ)(γ + 1) = 1 and (v
α
j ⌈λ)(γ) 6= (w
α
j ⌈λ)(γ).
Since γ+1<λ and max{β, oλ(vαi ), o
λ(vαj )}> γ+1, it follows that
uα⌈γ +2 = vα⌈γ + 2 and therefore uα /∈ pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ)).
3. There is a limit ordinal λ̂ < λ such that
(vαi ⌈λ)(λ̂) = (w
α
i ⌈λ)(λ̂) = 1 and λ̂− par(v
α
j ) 6= λ̂− par(w
α
j ).
We have ξ > λ̂, and therefore
(uαi ⌈λ)(λ̂) = (v
α
i ⌈λ)(λ̂) and λ̂− par(u
α
j ) = λ̂− par(v
α
j ).
It follows that uα /∈ pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ)).
4. (vαi ⌈λ)(0) = (w
α
i ⌈λ)(0) = 1 and v0 6=w0. We have
(uαi ⌈λ)(0) = (v
α
i ⌈λ)(0) = 1 and u0 = v0.
It follows that uα /∈ pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ)). 
Proof of Lemma 13. Let vα ∈E. Define uα ∈Wα by
u0 := v0,
uαi := v
α
i ,
uαj (γ) := v
α
j (γ) for all γ < α with γ 6= β,
uαj (β) := 1− v
α
j (β).
It follows that uαj (β) 6= v
α
j (β) and u
α⌈β = vα⌈β, which implies uα ∈E.
(a) If vα ∈ Pi(w
α), then it is easy to check that uα ∈ Pi(v
α) = Pi(w
α).
(b) If vα ∈ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β + 1)) ∩ (Wα \ Pi(w
α)), then it follows that
vα ∈ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β +1)) and vαi (β + 1) = 1. It is again easy to check that
uα ∈ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(v
α⌈β + 1)) = pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β + 1)) and since uαi (β + 1) = 1,
we have uα ∈ (Wα \ Pi(w
α)).
(c) If vα /∈ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β + 1)), then there are four cases:
1. vαi ⌈β + 1 6= w
α
i ⌈β + 1. From u
α
i ⌈β + 1 = v
α
i ⌈β + 1, it follows that
uα /∈ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β +1)).
FINITELY ADDITIVE BELIEFS 33
2. There is a γ < β such that
(vαi ⌈β +1)(γ +1) = (w
α
i ⌈β + 1)(γ +1) = 1
and
(vαj ⌈β +1)(γ) 6= (w
α
j ⌈β +1)(γ).
By the definition of uα, (uαi ⌈β +1)(γ +1) = 1 and, since γ < β,
(vαj ⌈β + 1)(γ) = (u
α
j ⌈β +1)(γ),
hence uα /∈ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β +1)).
3. There is a limit ordinal λ < β +1 such that
(vαi ⌈β+1)(λ) = (w
α
i ⌈β+1)(λ) = 1 and λ−par(v
α
j ) 6= λ−par(w
α
j ).
We have (uαi ⌈β + 1)(λ) = 1 and, since λ ≤ β, λ − par(u
α
j ) = λ −
par(vαj ). It follows that u
α /∈ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β +1)).
4. (vαi ⌈β + 1)(0) = (w
α
i ⌈β +1)(0) = 1 and v0 6=w0. We have
(uαi ⌈β +1)(0) = (v
α
i ⌈β + 1)(0) = 1 and u0 = v0.
It follows that uα /∈ pi−1β+1,α(Pi(w
α⌈β + 1)). 
Proof of Lemma 14. The first point of the lemma follows from Lem-
mas 10 and 12.
The second point follows from the first and the fact that[[ ⋃
β<λ
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1λ,α(Pi(w
α⌈λ))
]
, Pi(w
α)
]
is a field on Wα (and therefore it is closed under complements).
The last two points of the lemma follow directly from the first two points.

Proof of Lemma 15. Note that if α≥ β + 1, then⋃
ξ<β+1
pi−1ξ,α(Pow(W
ξ)) = pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)).
The proof is now analogous to the proof of Lemma 14—just replace λ by
β + 1 and Lemma 12 by Lemma 13. 
Proof of Lemma 16. Since Pi(w
α)⊆ pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)), it follows from
the definition of [ ⋃
β<γ
pi−1β,α(Pow(W
β)), pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ))
]
,
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that there is a β < γ and an Eβ ⊆W β such that
E ∩ pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)) = pi−1β,α(E
β)∩ pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ))⊇ Pi(w
α).
Claim. pi−1β,α(E
β)⊇ pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)).
Assume to the contrary, that there is a vα ∈ pi−1γ,α(Pi(w
α⌈γ)) \ pi−1β,α(E
β).
Since β+1≤ γ, we have vα⌈β +1 ∈ Pi(w
α⌈β +1). By Lemma 11, there is a
uα ∈ Pi(w
α) such that uα⌈β = vα⌈β. Since Eβ ⊆W β and vα /∈ pi−1β,α(E
β), it
follows that uα /∈ pi−1β,α(E
β), a contradiction to pi−1β,α(E
β)⊇ Pi(w
α). 
Proof of Lemma 17. Assume that there is a vλ ∈ pi−1β+1,λ(Pi(w
λ⌈β +
1)) \pi−1β,λ(E
β). By Lemma 11, there is a uλ ∈ Pi(w
λ) such that uλ⌈β = vλ⌈β.
Therefore uλ /∈ pi−1β,λ(E
β), a contradiction to pi−1β,λ(E
β)⊇ Pi(w
λ). 
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 7. We prove the lemma by induction on the forma-
tion of κ-expressions.
(a) Let ϕ=E, where E ∈Σ{h,t} =Pow({h, t}), and let w
κ, uκ ∈W κ such
that wκ⌈0 = uκ⌈0. By definition, vκ ∈ EW
κ
iff θ(vκ) ∈ E, for vκ ∈W κ. But
we have θ(vκ) = v0 = v
κ⌈0, for vκ ∈W κ. It follows that uκ ∈ EW
κ
iff wκ ∈
EW
κ
.
(b) Let ϕ = ¬ψ such that depth(ϕ) ≤ α and let wκ, uκ ∈W κ such that
wκ⌈α= uκ⌈α. It follows that depth(ψ)≤ α and uκ ∈ ϕW
κ
iff uκ /∈ ψW
κ
iff—
by the induction assumption—wκ /∈ ψW
κ
, which is the case iff wκ ∈ ϕW
κ
.
(c) Let p ∈ [0,1], i ∈ {a, b}, ϕ=Bpi (ψ), dp(ψ)+1 = β+1≤ α and w
κ, uκ ∈
W κ such that wκ⌈α= uκ⌈α. By the induction assumption, there is a Eβ ⊆
W β such that ψW
κ
= pi−1β,κ(E
β). By Theorem 2 and Remark 11,
Ti(u
κ)(ψW
κ
) = Ti(w
κ)(ψW
κ
).
It follows that uκ ∈ (Bpi (ψ))
Wκ iff wκ ∈ (Bpi (ψ))
Wκ .
(d) Let |Ψ|< κ, ϕ=
∧
ψ∈Ψψ such that depth(ϕ)≤ α, and let w
κ, uκ ∈W κ
such that wκ⌈α = uκ⌈α. Then depth(ψ) ≤ α, for ψ ∈ Ψ. By the induction
assumption, uκ ∈ ψW
κ
iff wκ ∈ ψW
κ
, for ψ ∈Ψ. It follows that uκ ∈ ϕW
κ
iff
wκ ∈ ϕW
κ
.

Lemma 8 follows directly from Theorem 2 and Remark 11.
Proof of Lemma 9. The first point is clear. We show the second and
the third points by a transfinite induction on 0≤ β < κ.
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(a) β = 0. According to Lemma 8 and the first point of this lemma, we
have
(ϕ1i (0))
Wκ := (B1i ({h}) ∨B
1
i ({t}))
Wκ = [Xκi (0) = 1]
and
(ϕ0i (0))
Wκ := (¬(B1i ({h}) ∨B
1
i ({t})))
Wκ = [Xκi (0) = 0].
And obviously, dp(ϕ0i (0)) = dp(ϕ
1
i (0)) = 1.
(b) β = γ +1. According to the induction assumption, there are κ-expressions
ϕ0j (γ) and ϕ
1
j (γ) such that
(ϕ0j (γ))
Wκ = [Xκj (γ) = 0],
(ϕ1j (γ))
Wκ = [Xκj (γ) = 1],
dp(ϕ0j (γ)) = dp(ϕ
1
j (γ))
= β.
Define
ϕ1i (β) :=B
1
i (ϕ
0
j (γ)) ∨B
1
i (ϕ
1
j (γ))
and
ϕ0i (β) := ¬ϕ
1
i (β).
ϕ1i (β) and ϕ
0
i (β) are κ-expressions of depth β +1. We have
[Xκi (β) = 0] =W
κ \ [Xκi (β) = 1].
By Lemma 8 and the induction assumption, it follows that
[Xκi (β) = 1] = (ϕ
1
i (β))
Wκ
and
[Xκi (β) = 0] = (ϕ
0
i (β))
Wκ .
(c) Let λ < κ be a limit ordinal. For i ∈ {a, b} and β < λ define in W κ:
[Y λi (β)] := [X
κ
i (β) = 1]∩
⋂
β<α<λ
[Xκi (α) = 0],
[Zλi ] :=
⋂
0≤α<λ
[Xκi (α) = 0].
According to the induction assumption for α,β < λ and the fact that
|λ|<κ, it follows that
ψλi (β) := ϕ
1
i (β) ∧
∧
β<α<λ
ϕ0i (α)
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and
χλi :=
∧
0≤α<λ
ϕ0i (α)
are κ-expressions such that
dp(ψλi (β)) = max{β +1, sup{dp(ϕ
0
i (α))|β < α< λ}}
= sup{α+1|α < λ}
= λ,
and, similarly, dp(χλi ) = λ.
It follows from the induction assumption that
[Y λi (β)] = (ψ
λ
i (β))
Wκ and [Zλi ] = (χ
λ
i )
Wκ .
Since oλ(wκi ), for w
κ
i ∈W
κ
i , can never be a limit ordinal, we have
[λ− par(Xκi ) = even] = [Z
λ
i ]∪
⋃
β<λ,β odd
[Y λi (β)]
and
[λ− par(Xκi ) = odd] =
⋃
β<λ,β even
[Y λi (β)].
Again, since |λ|<κ, it follows from the above that
ϕeveni (λ) := χ
λ
i ∨
∨
β<λ,β odd
ψλi (β)
and
ϕoddi (λ) :=
∨
β<λ,β even
ψλi (β)
are κ-expressions such that
dp(ϕeveni (λ)) =max{dp(χ
λ
i ), sup{dp(ψ
λ
i (β))|β < λ,β odd}}= λ,
and
dp(ϕoddi (λ)) = λ.
By the definitions and the induction assumption, we have
(ϕeveni (λ))
Wκ = [λ− par(Xκi ) = even]
and
(ϕoddi (λ))
Wκ = [λ− par(Xκi ) = odd].
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(d) β = λ, λ limit ordinal < κ. By Lemma 8 and the above we have
(ϕ1i (λ))
Wκ := (B1i (ϕ
even
j (λ)) ∨B
1
i (ϕ
odd
j (λ)))
Wκ = [Xκi (λ) = 1],
(ϕ0i (λ))
Wκ := (¬(B1i (ϕ
even
j (λ)) ∨B
1
i (ϕ
odd
j (λ))))
Wκ = [Xκi (λ) = 0]
and
dp(B1i (ϕ
even
j (λ)) ∨B
1
i (ϕ
odd
j (λ)))
Wκ
= dp(¬(B1i (ϕ
even
j (λ)) ∨B
1
i (ϕ
odd
j (λ))))
Wκ
= λ+1. 
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